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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
FACT-FINDING PRAXIS IN ITS LIVING
FORMS: A TWAIL PERSPECTIVE

By
Obiora C. Okafor*
1 troduction
...Afternational human rights
fact-finding (hereinafter
"IHRFF") has been defined, rather generously, as:
A method of ascertaining facts through the
evaluation
and compilation
of
various
sources ... [which]
serves
to
information
illuminate
the
circumstances,
causes,
consequences and aftermath of an event from a
systematic collection of facts. 1

*

l.

Professor of International Law at the Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, Toronto, Canada; Vice-Chair/Rapporteur at the UN Human
Rights Council Advisory Committee; and most recently the Gani Fawehinmi
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Human Rights Law at the Nigerian
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Abuja, Nigeria. Ph. D, LL.M (the
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada); LL.M, LL.B (Hons)
(the University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus). I am grateful to Professors
Phillip Alston and Sarah Knuckey, and the other organizers of the
Conference on " International Human Rights Fact-Finding in the TwentyFirst Century" held at the New York University School of Law's Centre for
Human Rights and Global Justice, 31 October to 2 November, 2013, for
their invitation to prepare and present this article. I also wish to
acknowledge my indebtedness to Joanna Enns for her excellent research
assistance.
T. Boutrouche, "Credible Fact-Finding and Allegations of International
Humanitarian Law Violations: Challenges in Theory and Practice" (2011)
16 J Conflict & Security Law l at 2 [Boutrouche]. See also International Bar
Association and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute at Lund University,
Guidelines 011 Intemarional Human Rights Fact-Finding Visits and Reports
(the Lund-London Guidelines), lsl June 2009 at 2 [IBA].
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Understood in this way, IHRFF is not a new activity.
Rather, various organizations, groups, and entities have
engaged in it for a very long time. 2 Indeed, issues relating to
its ways and means, conceptual and operational problems, and
best practices have occupied the attention of many
practitioners, and cringed the brows of many of scholars, for a
fairly long time. 3 However, recent years have witnessed an
increased deployment of IHRFF in response to alleged
violations of human rights in a range of climes. 4 This may be a
possible justification for the renewed attention that it appears
to receiving among academics and practitioners alike. In
particular, given the increasing salience of IHRFF and the
tremendous power that its practitioners can increasingly exert
in both domestic and world affairs, contemporary scholarly
commentators appear to be justified in renewing their quest to
2.
3.

See D.F. Orentlicher: "Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human
Rights Fact-Finding" (1990) 3 Harv Hum Rts J 83 at 104 [Orentlicher].
See e.g. UN Secretary General, Report 011 Methods of Fact-Finding (1966)
UN Doc. A/6228, GAOR (XXI), AMexes Vol. 2, Agenda item 87;
Orentlicher, supra note 2; H. Thoolen & B. Verstappen: Human Rights
Missions: A Study of the Fact-Finding Practice of Non-Governmental
Organizations (Dorderecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986); R.B. Reiter, M.V.
Zunzunegui & J. Quiroga: "Guidelines for Field Reporting of Basic Human
Rights Violations" (1986) 8 Hum Rts Q 628; D. Weissbrodt & J. McCarthy,
"Fact-finding by Non-Governmental Organizations" in B. Ramcharan, ed,

lmernational Law and Fact-Finding in the Field of Human Rights
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) at 186; R. C. Blitt, "Who Will Watch
the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the
Case for Regulation" (2007) S Int'l J Civil Society Law 8 at 9 [Blitt]; L.
Talsma, "U.N. Human Rights Fact-Finding: Establishing Individual
Criminal Responsibility" (2012) 24 Fla J Int'l L 383 at 401 [Talsma]; P.
Alston, "The Commission on Human Rights" in P. Alston, ed, The United
Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992) at 170 [Alston]; G.M . Steinberg, A. Hertzberg & J. Berman,

Best Practices for Human Rights and Humanitarian NGO Fact-Finding
4.

(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) [Steinberg, Hertzberg, and Berman].
Boutrouche, supra note l at 3.
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understand IHRFF and, if necessary, stimulate its thoughtful
reform. This article ·is a modest attempt to contribute to the
emergent process of the renewed study of that praxis.
As a first step, however, it is necessary to distinguish
between the various kinds of IHRFF. As Frans Viljo~n has
observed, one must distinguish between the types of IHRFF ·
conducted by a range of actors. 5 Viljoen is correct, for as may
be clear to 'd1sceruing obser vers . of the international scene,
. IHRFF can be co!].ducted by a UN organ (suc.h as the UN
. Human . Rights C~~)itil), an ,.i~~~rnational NGO (such as
\ 'Amnesty" I.nterna:tio~i."or Hwnart ·l ights Watch), a IocafNGO
'. '(such as the Atrief.iaan Civil Li~rties Union or tl}e Civil
of Nigeria);
and an indfviduar ·state
. ·.. Liberties Organizit~~:
.._ .
.
(such as the USA ot. China). M . . Cherif Bassiouni has _even
made hnportant dis~ctions among' the various sub-types and
manifestations of ..:S{)ecifically UN-driven IHRFF missions
. (based .on the ideritJiY. of the .organ that established them, the
. ;.~ degree ·o·f supp{fr{lfut~(eajoy from the Western countries w'hich
· hold a veto i11 the U~/ Security Council, and so on). 6 It 'is also
possible to adopt the ~alternative (but not necessarily opposing)
· taxonomy suggested h y Viljoen which differentiates among
three kinds of IHRFF , namely: investigative IHRFF, indirect
IHRFF via eX.amining state reports, and complaints-based
IHRFF. 7 While
of these taxonomical distinctions must be
kept in mind as. one analyzes IHRFF (principally because the
various manifestations and types of this IHRFF are not always

all

5.

6.
7.

F. Viljoen: "Fact-Finding by UN Human Rights Complaints Bodies Analysis and Suggested Reforms" (2004) 8 Max Planck Yearbook of United
Nations Law 49 at 54 [Viljoen).
M. C. Bassiouni: "Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions"
(2001) 5 Wash UJL & Pol'y 35 at 35 [Bassiouni).
Viljoen, supra note 5.
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identical in form and substance, and the pitfalls of one kind or
sub-kind of IHRFF may have been overcome by another fo1m
or sub-form of that praxis), it should be noted here that the
focus of the analysis in this article is on investigative IHRFF
as conducted by the UN, international NGOs, local NGOs, or
one country (as opposed to either indirect or complaint-based
IHRFF).
With this in mind, the main goal of the article is to
systematically intenogate and assess IHRFF as a form of
praxis, and to do so from a critical third world approach to
interm~tional law (TWAIL) perspective. To what extent (if at
all) does IHRFF suffer from certain of the problematic features
of general international law praxis that have been identified
and analysed by TWAIL scholars (as well as some other
cdtical socio-legal thinkers)? More specifically, to what extent
(if at all) doe~ IHRFF suffer from a witting or unwitting (and
almost always .problematic) adherence to the heaven/hell
binary, the one-way traffic paradigm, the orientation of the
Western gaze, colonialist styles and approaches, and other
similarly problem<ltic methodological approaches? To what
extent (if at all) does IHRFF suffer from a conscious or
unconscious facilitation of or implication in the unqualified and
univalent stigmatization of third world cultures, and from a
tendency to engage in a conceptual "economy of
appearances"? To what degree (if at all) has IHRFF been
susceptible to .capture by certain formatio ns or matrixes of
global power? What, if any, are the implications for IHRFF of
it being afflicted by any of these identified problems? And in
the circumstances, what would a reasonably acceptable form of .
IHRFF look like? In this last connection, the point is that even
if IHRFF does not currently suffer in significant measure from
any of the afflictions mentioned here, there may be significant
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value in reminding those who engage in it of the need to
become or remain as alert as they possibly can to these
potential pitfalls.
Since the analytical interrogation and assessment of IHRFF
that is undertaken in this article is largely framed, shaped and
anin1ated by a TWAIL perspective, it is important that the
nature of that approach is outlined at the outset, albeit rather
briefly. As I have noted elsewhere, TWAIL is an umbrella
signifier for a broad range .of scholars who participate in what
Makau Mutua has described as a dialectic of opposition to the
generally unequal' unfair and unjust character of an
international legal regime that all too often (but not always)
helps subject the Third World to domination, subordination
and serious disadvantage. 8 Beyond this pithy explanation,
space constraints do not allow much more to be said here
regarding the nature of TWAIL as a scholarly movement. In
any case, since the nature of the TWAIL movement has been
exhaustively adumbrated and explained in the literature, a
detailed treatment of that definitional question should not
detain us. Suffice it to emphasize that, as internally diverse as
their approaches and conclusions can often be:
TW.fi.IL scholars (or "TWAILers") are solidly
united by a shared ethical commitment to the
intellectual and practical struggle to expose,
reform, or even retrench those features of the
internatio~al legal system that help create or
maintain the generally unequal, unfair, or unji:ist
8.

0. C. Okafor: " Marxian Embraces (and De-Couplings) in Upendra Baxi's
Human Rights Scholarship: A Case Study" in S. Marks, ed, lntemational
Law 011 the Left (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 257; M.
Mutua: "What is TWAIL?" (2000) 94 ASIL Proceedings 31.
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global order. .. a commitment to centre the rest
rather then merely the west, thereby taking the
lives and experiences of those who have selfidentified as Third World much more seriously
than has generally been the case.9 ·
Methodologically, the analysis in article is developed via a
step-by-step consideration of the available "primary" 10 and
secondary evidence, in light of insig~ts . that are already
available in the ·academic TWAIL litei~ture regarding the
prob.l~pJ.atic features of general internat~o:ri~l
praxis (some
of ~4iCh have been identified above). T..~l,.S. eyi~ence consists
chiefly of the contents of a~tual IHRFF .,Rep0,rts (as prodll;ced
by UN agencies or NGOs), other pertinent documents
proct.ti~d by some of thes,e, actors (susµ·. as tQ.e "F~.cts and
Figur~~,, document produced by the O~f(.~e·:- of ·:i:he U.N High
Commissioner for Human Rights), and mli.terial ·that is ·already
.
.·'·
available in academic writings on IHRFF ...' .
Another important methodological pofut _.is ' that ~ to the
extent that this is even possible - it is imp~;rativ~ that scholars,
suppor.t1tibe.
· human rights
···
such as myself, who largely
..
• .
( .. . t ·.
.
movement,
maintain ~ :·· · large end\i.gh.· measure of
methoc;loJogical detachment when they aq~Jyze that movement
or any aspect of it. 11 There is a great nee.c(for.
those of us who
.
.

iaw

'

9.

0. C. Okafor: "Newness, Imperialism and International Legal Reform in
our Time: A TWAIL Perspective" (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 171at176.
10. The phrase "primary evidence" refers to the reports and other documents
produced and/or published by the UN, governments, or NGOs which we
reviewed as part of our research.
11. For an excellent discussion of "porosity of the border between activism and
research," and an analysis of "the slippage between the role of the activist
(!.Ild scholar and the impossibility of separating them," see S.E. Merry,
"Anthropology and Activism: Researching Human Rights across Porous
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tend to agree with Upendra Baxi (that even with all its
problems, the movement now appears to be all that we have to
interrogate the barbarisms of power) 12 to struggle as much as
we can to analyze that movement in as objective a manner as
possible. This need becomes even more urgent and the task
even more difficult, when it is realised that, as Mutua has
noted, the movement now sits atop a very high "moral
plateau"; 13 what Diane Orcntlichcr had referred to earlier as
the "pr~stige" that the movement has acquired. 14
In another methodological vein, it should also be pointed
out here that the analysis undertaken in this article is framed to
an important degree by both geographic and temporal
limitations. In terms of its geographic limitation, the vast
majority of the "primary" evidence that are relied on relate to
IHRFF work that has been done in or with regard to some
country or the other on the African continent. The choice to
limit the collection and analysis of this material to those
relating in a significant way to an African country was dictated
by the vastness of the aggregate amount of IHRFF Reports out
there, and the concomitant need to work with a manageable
amount of material. This consideration also informed the
decision to impose a temporal limitation on that evidence. As
such the vast majority of the "primary" evidence that are
relied on in this article are sourced from IHRFF Reports and
other documents produced between 2008 and 2013. It is this

Boundaries" (2008) 28 Political and Legal Anthropology Review 240
[Merry].
12. U. Baxi: Tire Future of Human Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2006) at 4 [Baxi, "Future of Human Rights"].
13. M. Mutua: Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia:
University of Philadelphia Press, 2002) at 40.
14. Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 83.
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admittedly geographically and temporally limited collection of
evidence and data that constitute the bulk of the primary
material that is subjected to a TWAIL analysis in this article.
In order to facilitate the systematic conduct of this
analytical exercise, the article is organized into four major
segments, this introduction included. Following this
introductory section, section II examines the available
evidence, data and scholarly insights in order to help decipher
the extent (if any) to which more contemporary IHRFF praxis
is afflicted (or not afflicted) by one or more of the problematic
characteristics .or tendencies of international law praxis that
TWAIL scholars have long identified and discussed. Following
this fairly extensive analysis, an attempt is made in section III
to reflect on the lessons which ought to be learnt there from.
The main question that is asked and addressed in this section is
what should IHRFF become, if its potential is to be fully
realised? Section IV concludes the article.
Viewing IHRFF from a TWAIL Perspective
This section is devoted to an analysis of more contemporary
IHRFF praxis from a TWAIL perspective. The main question
here is the extent to which IHRFF praxis is afflicted (if at all)
by any of tl1e problematic features of international law praxis
identified in the introductory section of this article. To this
end, the rest of the section is sub-divided into eight subsections, each devoted to a consideration of IHRFF in the light
of TWAIL or similarly critical insights regarding one such
problematic· characteristic or tendency. These problematic
characteristics and tendencies are: the heaven/hell binary, the
one-way traffic paradigm, fixation on the orientation of the
Western ·gaze, adherence to colonialist styles and approaches,
adherence to other problematic methodological approaches, the
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unqualified and univalent stigmatization of third world
cultures, engagement in a conceptual "economy of
appearances," and susceptibility to capture by certain
formations or matrixes of global power.

The Heavcn/Ifoll Dinary
TW AIL scholars have long critiqued the tendency of
international human rights praxis and discourse to foster and
reproduce a binary dichotomy tha.t ruptures the globe into two
conceptual communities, the one "heavenly" and the other
"liellish"; 15 a dichotomy that draws fairly neat and bright lines
between "the Good West" and "the bad Third World. " 16 These
scholars have also shown not just that this binary is in fact not
based on fully appreciated reality, 17 but that it is also harmful
to the human rights struggle (e.g. by facilitating a human
rights monologue rather than a dialogue, and helping to foster
15. See 0. C. Okafor & S. C. Agbakwa: "Re-Imagining International Human
Rights Education in Our Time: Beyond Three Constitutive Orthodoxies"
(2001) 14 Leiden J Int'l L 563 at 566-573 (Okafor & Agbakwa, "ReImagining"]. See also M. Mutua, "Savages, Victims and Saviors: The
Metaphor of Human Rights" (2001) 42 Harvard Int'l LJ 201 [Mutua,
"Savages"); Baxi, "Future of Human Rights''., supra note 12; U. Baxi, "'A
Work in Progress'?: The United States' Report to the United Nations'
Human Rights Committee" (1995) 35 Indian Journal of International Law 34
[Baxi, "Work in Progress"]; U. Baxi, "Random Reflections on the
[Im]possibility of Human Rights, online:
ltttp://www.pdl1re.org/dialog11elrejlectio11s.lu111l
[Baxi,
"Random
Reflections"); P. Houtondji, "The Master's Voice - Remarks on the
Problem of Human Rights in Africa" in UNESCO, Pltilosopltical
Fo1111datio11s of H11111a11 Rigltts (Paris: UNESCO, 1986) at 320 [Houtondji].
16. See 0 . C. Okafor, "On the Patchiness, Promise and Perils of "Global"
Human Rights Law", 2011 Diaspora Scholars Lecture at the Nigerian
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos, Nrgeria at 47.
17. See e.g. Okafor & Agbakwa, "Re-Imagining", supra note 15 at 571; Baxi,
"Work in Progress", supra note 15 at 39.
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or augment alienation from the human rights struggle which
impedes efforts at generating a measure of mass cultural
legitimacy for the human rights project). 18 However, as the
TWAIL and other critical literature has convincingly
established the existence of this binary and persuasively
demonstrated its negative effects on the human rights struggle
in general, the re-development of these twin arguments will
neither occupy nor detain us here. Rather , what is focused
upon in this section is , in the main, an analysis of IHRFF
(which is itself only one aspect/dimension of human rights
praxis) in order to decipher the extent .to which it participates .
in the (re)production of this problematic heaven/hell binary. A
concomitant issue is the degree to which IHRFF thinkers and ,
practitioners ought to remain alert - even in this day and age - ·
to the danger of their participation in its reproduction.
What therefore does the available evidence and analysis
suggest about IHRFF praxis' relationship to the heaven/hell
binary? Does IHRFF praxis help at all to (re)produce this neat
dichotomy and differentiate in the result between a virtually
"innocent West" and a neat-absolutely "savage Third World"?
One major way in which IHRFF praxis could help (re)produce
this heaven/hell binary is through a disproportionate·
concentration of its activities or operations in the Third World,
while focusing relatively little attention on the Western and the
most powerful states. 19 This all-too-often leaves the impression.
in the undiscerning mind that there was very little, if any, real . ...
necessity to focus on IHRFF on the Western or most powerful
states. In other words, the impression is left that these states
escaped IHRFF scrutiny largely because they are in fact "good
18. See Okafor & Agbakwa: "Re-Imagining" 1 supra note 15 at 573.
19. Many in government circles in the USA have even tended to suggest that
this should be the case. See Baxi: "Work in Progress", supra note 15.

.: .
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states" that are squeaky clean in the relevant respects. The
available evidence suggests that the IHRFF praxis of the major
international NGOs is much more globally-focused today than
was the case a decade or two ago. 20 Even the unil~teral
IHRFF of certain countries (especially the USA) are fairly
global in ambition - excepting the fact that they do not tend to
pay attention to the specks in their own eyes. 21 While a
UN IHRFF missions sent to
statistical survey of t~~e number
developed. and/or very powerful countries as . compared . to
those ·sent to the weaker Third World states does not indicate
that this bias is as present 'today in UN IHRFF praxis as it
once appeared to b~, the very fact th~t a nuge majority of such
missions/reports target Third World states can function to
leave the not entirely accurate impression in the minds of alltoo-many observers. that serious human rights violations almost
always occur in Thir~ World .states, thereby crowding out
the violations that do occur in
from their minds the pictures
and by the more powe~ful states .22 Perhaps more importantly,

of

of

20. See e.g.. Amnesty Intcrpatkmal, State of the World's Human Rights Report,
2012 (London: Anutes~y International 2012) (which focuses on stronger and
weaker, Westcrn-and..non-Wcstcm, countries alike).
21. See e.g. U.S. Department of State, Coun(ly Reports on Human Rig/its
Practices for 2012, onlinc:

http://ww1v.state.gov/j/drllrls/hrrptihu111a11riglltsreportl#wrapper;
Human
Rights Record of tile United States iu 2012, .online:
lwp://11ews.xi11/111a11et..com/e11glish/world/20l3-04/21le 132327175 2. lltm.
22.

to

A review of the. data on reports and missions sent bY the UN
various
states between. 2008-201'2 sugges.ts that 14 of the 276 missions/reports
(S.07%) targeted the five veto-power wielding PS states (a proxy for the
most powerful states), which constitute roughly 2.S9% of the 193 states UN
states; SL of the 276 missions/reports ( 18.48%) targeted states which belong
to the group of non-PS <Jeveloped states, which make up roughly 18.13 % of
UN states; and -211 of the 276 missions/reports (76.4S%) targeted the
weaker non-PS Third World states, which make up roughly 79.28% of UN
states. Now, of cours_e, an analysis regarding the rate of incidence of
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other statistical measures suggest that the heaven/hell binary
may still be as strongly supported by UN-driven IHRFF praxis
as ever. 23
Another major way in which IHRFF helps (re)producc U1is
heaven/hell binary is through the all-too-frequent failure to
foreground Third World's contributions to, or excellence/
leadership in, the development of or respect for certain human
rights norms, while highlighting constantly the admittedly
numerous instances of the violation of human rights by Third
World states. For example, how many IHRFF efforts or
reports, if any, have been devoted to the documentation of prohuman rights third world cultural forms and praxis?24 To what
extent has IHRFF recorded and disseminated the fact that
Rwanda (and not the USA or Britain) holds the all-time world
record for the actual implementation of gender equality in
representation in Parliament; 25 or that Lhe Seychelles, Senegal,

(serious) human rights violations (at best a massive task) might yield a
different perspective. But this analysis suffices to give a sense of the
intensity or otherwise of focus of UN-driven IHRFF on certain groupings of
states.
23. For example, of the sixteen (16) countries to which country-specific
rapporteurs (who engage in fact-finding) were appointed by the UN Human
Rights Council between 2008 and 2013, only one (Belarus). i.e. 6.25%,
could be viewed as a non-Third World state, meaning that a whopping
92.75% were Third World countries. Considering thal the appointment of a
country-specific rapporteur in respect of a country is one of the strongest
measures that the Human Rights Council takes against human rights
violating states, this statistic is telling.
24. As is discussed later, a recent attempt to do so by the UN Human Rights
Council, through its Advisory Committee, was strongly opposed and treated
with great suspicion by many Western Governments and NGOs, including
some International NGOs.
25. Women hold 64% of the seats in Rwanda's current Parliament. See Atlanta
/Jttp://atlantablackstar.com/2013110/12/nva11dasBlackstar,
onl ine:
parlia111e111-has-tfle-higflest-fe11tale-repres11wtio11-of-any-11atio11-011-earthl;
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South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania , Uganda, and Angola
have all far outpaced most non-Scandinavian Western countries
(and certainly the USA) in this same regard? 26 Why does
Nigeria's inunense contribution (given its meagre resources
relative to \Vestern countries) to the human rights project of
restoring peace and saving millions of lives in the West
African sub-region and beyond tend to be either ignored, or
highlighted in the negative, in the dominant human rightsrelated commentaries, usually whe1' abuses are committed by
some of its troops? 27 These sorts of silences, or at best, low
decibel acknowledgements, amidst the incessant loudness of
the constant highlighting of Third World human rights
violations all-too-often helps give the impression that the T hird
World is almost always a kind of human rights desert, where
very little, if any, thirsting for dignity or freedom is quenched,
and a kind of near-absolutely benighted region of our world.
And so when what is almost always fore-grounded by IHRFF
is the "hellish" portion of the Third World picture, and what is
constantly back-grounded is the "heavenly" portion of that
picture, the impression of the Third World as a near-absolute
human rights hell is (re)produced, and when this is contrasted

Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments," online:

http://www. ipu. orp,lw11111-elclassif.l1r111.
26. Ibid.
27. See 0. C. Okafor: "Book Review of Charlotte Ku and Harold Jacobson,
eds., Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law"
(2004) UBC L Rev 547. See also I. A. Abdulwaheed: "Nigeria and
Peacekeeping Process in Africa: The Darfur Peace Process in Sudan" (20 12}
3 International Journal of Politics and Good Governance l at 3; L. A.
Horvitz & C. Catherwood, Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide (New
York: Infobase, 201 l); G. Sanghera, M. Henry & P. Higate: "Peacekeepers
as New Men? Security and Masculinity in the United Nations Mission in
Liberia" (SPAIS, University of Bristol, Working Article No. 02-08) at 10.
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with the extensive fore-grounding of the heavenly aspects of
the Western picture, the heaven/hell binary takes firm root.

The One-Way Traffic Paradigm
.
As a related point, TWAIL scholars have also shown that a
. logical end-product of a conceptualization of the human rights
situation around the world in ways that are framed by a nearabsolutist heaven/hell binary is the adherence of international
human rights praxis to the one-way traffic paradigm in which
human rights knowledge, scrutiny and supervision tends to
flow from those parts of the world (i.e. the West) which
supposedly invented human rights, which know almost
everything about it already, and which observe it almost to the
letter, in the direction of those regions of the world (i.e. the
Third World) which apparently did not invent human rights,
which tend to know very little - if anything - about it, and
which hardly ever observe it. 28 It has also been pointed out in
support of this argument that the US State Department
prepares IHRFF Reports on other countries but not on itself; 29
that international human rights programs and clinics in North
America tend to focus heavily on the Third World and not on
their own countries; 30 and that the USA at one extreme rarely
28. See Okafor & Agbakwa, "Re-Imagining", supra note 15 at 575. See also
Mutua, "Savages", supra note 15; Baxi, "Future of Human Rights", supra
note 12; Baxi, "Work in Progress", supra note 15; Baxi, "Random
Reflections", supra note 15; Houtondji, supra note 15.
29. See J. Enns, "Research Memorandum on US Department of State Human
Rights Reports," 16 September 2013 (prepared for and on file with the
author). See also Baxi, "Work in Progress", supra note 15. ·
30. See T. Ezer & S. Deller Ross "Fact-Finding as a Lawmaking Tool for
Advancing Women's Human Rights" (2006) 7 Geo J of Gender & L 331; J.
Bond, "Global Classroom: International Human Rights Fact-Finding as
Clinical Method, The" (2001) 28 Wm Mitchell L Rev 317 at 320. Contra
Okafor & Agbakwa, "Re-Imagining", supra note 15 at 566.
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thinks of itself as a proper candidate for IHRFF or other
scrutiny. 31
What then is IHRFF praxis, specific relationship to this
kind of one-way traffic paradigm? Does IHRFF praxis help
(re)produce this paradigm? One accusation that has been
historically levelled against IHRFF is that it tended to exist in
a kind of geo-stationary orbit above the Third World (relative
to the degree of attention paid to scrutinizing Western or
others among. the most powerful states); and that mainstream .
IHRFF tended to focus to a disproportionate degree on Third
World countries. 32 As we have seen, IHRFF is no longer
nearly as disproportionately focused on the Third World as it
once was, although it still does function to an extent to help
create the impression that the Third World is a human rights
"hell" while the West is a human rights "heaven''. However,
as this argument has been developed in the last sub-section,
that analysis will not be repeated here. Suffice it to add that the
reason this one way traffic persists today (however attenuated
in degree) goes beyond the operation and effects of heaven/hell
binary, and extends to the effects of the power asymmetries
that deeply mark and characterise the relationships among
Western and Third World peoples. For example, if Third
World subalterns could speak, if they could autlior the
dominant human rights narratives, how would we see the
human rights situation in many Western states? And would not
more human rights knowledge flow from the Third World
toward the West?
It must also be noted that, in any case, whatever the
accuracy of the first point above, it is incontrovertible that
31. See Baxi, "Work in Progress ", supra note 15.
32. See Okafor & Agbakwa: "Re-Imagining", supra note 15.
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there is thus far very little, if any, IHRFF traffic that
originates from the weaker (almost all Third World) states and
flows in the direction of the richer and stronger (mostly
Western and PS) states. Nigeria.n or Senegalese NGOs rarely,
if ever , undertake IHRFF in or about the USA or France; but
the reverse occurs near-incessantly . For the reasons that have
already been offered in Lhe last sub-section, the much more
diverse way in which the UN does its own IHRFF softens, but
does not totally blunt this critique.
The problems with this kind of one-way IHRFF traffic are
myriad, but only t~o will be addressed here. The first is that
its underlying assumptions (that human rights scrutiny and
knowledge only need to flow largely in one pre-determined
direction) are factually flawed, and seriously so. The second is
that it helps to fos ter a racialized hierarchy in which Third
World societies are endemically and perpetually viewed as the
sites of human rights violations and investigations, and Third
World peoples are not adequately appreciated as agents of
human rights knowledge production, fact-finding, and
dissemination. Conversely, it tends to deprive the West of a
flow of human rights knowledge and example from the Third
World that could benefit it tremendously. For example, what
might US women (and even men) have learnt or benefited
from the remarkable Rwandan example of actual gender equity
in political representation?

Captivation by the Or ientation of the Western Gaze
TW AIL scholars have long identified and critiqued the
disproportionately constitutive role that the ipse dixit or gaze
of Europeans and other Westerners 33 tends to have on the
33. Just as there is no monolithic Third World, there is, of course, no
monolithic West or Europe, and internal dissent and divisions characterize
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perceived legitimacy or otherwise of Third World statehood,
governance, and practices 34 A similar argument ~an be made
with respect to IHRFF praxis. Here, the first contention is that
the orientation of the "Western gaze" tends to determine, for
the most part, the perceived need for, and legitimacy . of,
IHRFF. It is wherever the Western eye goes, on whatever
location its lenses are trained, and whatever it sees, that tends
to motivate, frame, constitute and legitimize IHRFF. Whatever
the Western eye does not see, is not pr:imed to see, or regards
with studied ignorance, does not tend to motivate, frame,
constittite and legitimize IHRFF. In other contexts, some· have
alluded to the agenda setting power of the so-called "CNN
effect" (one which is beginning to be countered and balanced
by the emerging "J\l Jazeera effect"). 35 J\nd so the massive
dispossession of black Africans from their lands that continues
to haunt life in much of Southern Africa, the brutalization and
killing of minorities in highly significant numbers in the inner
cities of the USA, the deplorable conditions in which
those regions of the world as much as anywhere else. As such, " Western"
and "European" is used here only as a shorthand for the dominant segments
of the populations of those regions.
34. For example, see O.C. Okafor, Re-Defining legitimate Statehood:
l11tematio11al Law and State Frag111ematio11 in Africa (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 2000); T. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of
!111ematio11al Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); M.
Mutua: "The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: J\n
Evaluation of the Language of Duties" (1995) 35 Va J Int'l L 339 [Mutua,
"The Banjul Charter"].
35. See S. Livingston, "Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media
Effects According to the Type of Military Intervention," Working Article,
Ke1U1edy School of Government, Harvard University, 1997; B. Bahador,

Tile CNN Effect in Action: How the New Media Pushed the West toward War
in Kosovo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); M.E. Zingarelli, The
CNN Effect and tile Al Jazeera Effect in Global Politics and Society (MA
Thesis, Georgetown University, 8 April 2010).
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indigenous North Americans actually live (amidst some of the
highest standards of living in the world), or even the socioeconomic rights violations that many MNCs perpetrate almost
at will in the Third World, have traditionally not tended to
motivate, frame, constitute or legitimjze IHRFF in nearly as
much measure as (admittedly equally important) issues such as
torture, freedom of expression, liberty rights, and so on.
It is also important to underlie the fact that a related way
in which the Western gaze exerts power and influence over
IHRFF praxis is ideational. Whatever the Western eye
recognizes as a violation of human rights t~nds to become
widely recognized as such, and whoever the Western eye sees
as a pariah, as the "bad guy,,, tends to become widely viewed
as such, and is more likely to attract mainstream IHRFF. It is ·
thus no wonder that, as we have seen, all but one of the
sixteen countries that were subjected to IHRFF by UN Human
Rights Council-appointed country rapporteurs between 20082013 are Third World states. And while this is on its own not
a dispositive fact, it is worthy of note that almost every one of
the persons appointed as country rapporteurs in respect of
those states during the same period hail3 from, grew up in,
was trained in, or lives or works in a Western country. Tills is
so despite the fact that they are overwhelmingly citizens of
Third World states. Here, it does not matter that Third World
states in fact make up the majority of the membership of the .
Human Rights Council or the bulk of its country-rapporteurs.
The point here is the ideational power of the Western gaze and . .
perspective, its power to dominate the construction of the
real.ity that is then taken as a given by others. Conversely,
whatever the Western eye recognizes as respect for human
rights tends to become widely recognized as such, and
whoever the Western eye sees as a human rights champion, as
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the "good guy," tends to become widely viewed as such, and
is less likely to attract IHRFF. Thus, for example, European
land grabs in Southetn Africa and the continued control of
those highly coveted lands by people of European-descent too
often to the serious socio-economic detriment of most of the
population - is scafcely seen as an egregious or even serious
human rights 'violalio11; the re-distribution of such lands is
rarely viewed · ~s ·a:"~fohJ.1 of respect for human rights; · the
European power$ wli~.- seized those lands in the first pl~ce are
hardly seen as bad gµys; and tb.e gpvernments that wa~t to re. distribute the. lartds~":are rarely .\·J~ed as good guys. :· This
.:-; ideational effect ·o(the . orierit~tiqn of the Western gaze in turn
· determines to a lar~·~degrce wher e IHRFF focuses· its attention
and wbere it travels:·. The perceived good guys tend to escape
tough scrutiny while -the appai;ent bad guys tend to attract it.
It should of course be admitted th~t IHRFF praxis
conducted by .Ill:aiiy ""UN bodies, such as the Human Rights
:. Council (HRC)~ is in-. general, hardly guilty of being captivated
. by . the Western gaz~: The new system of universal periodic
..review has helped· significantly to dull (though not deaden) the
··effect of the Western gaze on the HRC's praxis. 36 What is
more, the majority Third World composition of that body has
ensured that many otherwise marginalized human rights
concerns (such as the human rights implications of toxic waste
dumping, foreign debt, paying ransoms to hostage-takers, and
the ways ui which cultural values.can support lhe human rights
project) have received at least some degree of IHRFF
36.

For the nature and features of the new system of UPR, sec E.D. Redondo,
"The Universal Periodic Review - Is There Life Beypnd Naming and
Shaming in Human Rights Implementation? " (2012) 4 NZL Rev
(forthcoming), reproduced online:
lrttp:l/articles.ssmlso! 3/articles. cfm ?abstract_id== 2111607 [Redondo].
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attention. 37 But HRC-mandated IHRFF on many of these issues
are too often opposed or treated dismissively by far-too-many
of the Western states and experts, who despite their fewer
numbers remain disproportionately influential. 38

The Unqualified and Univalen t Stigmatization of Third
World Cultures
TWAIL and certain other critical scholars have convincingly
critiqued as seriously flawed and problematic the way in which
mainstream international human rights discourse has
traditionally treated "culture", especially the local cultures of
third world societies, as if they have "a fixed retrograde
valency. " 39 According to these scholars, since every cultural
tradition - more or less - contains within it some norms and
institutions that violate human rights as well as others that are
37 . For example, see the study conducted by the Human Rights Council
Advisory Committee (HRCAC) on the highly controversial issue of
"Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better
Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind", pursuant to Human
Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/16/3 of 8th April 20 11. The
.i:iecessity for this study was apparent to almost all Third World States and
some others, but it was opposed to varying degrees by most Western
countries and most NGOs. Indeed, many experts on the HRCAC expressed
strong reservations about studying the matter at all. The HRCAC's Report
on this study is documented as UN Doc. A/HRC/22/71, of 6 December
2012 [UN Doc.A/ HRC/22171].
38. Ibid. Here, the author relies in part on is own personal observations as ~
member of the HRCAC.
39. See C. Nyamu: "How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to
Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries"
(2000) 41 Harv Int'l U 381 [Nyamu]; Mutua: "The Banjul Charter", supra
note 34; ·0. C. Okafor: "Attainments, Eclipses and Disciplinary Renewal· in
International Human Rights Law: A Critical Overview" in D . Armstrong,
ed, Routledge Handbook of I111ernational Law (London: Routledge, 2009) at
307 [Okafor, "Attainments"]; and A. Riles, "Anthropology, Human Rights
and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage" (2004) 15 Finnish
Yearbook of International Law 9 [Riles].
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supportive of human rights, it does not make sense to
stigmatize culture (especially those of Third World societies)
in a near-absolute, univalent and unqualified way, as almost
always violative of human rights, as more or less bad for
human dignity , as obstacles to be surmouuted, or as a huge
part of the problem. Yet, this remains the dominant tendency
in international human rights discourse today. 40 Rarely is
culture imagined as an important part of the solution. 41
Something constructed . as "culture" is too often opposed
squarely to something imagined as "human rights ;" as if
human rights are somehow culture-free and cultures are
somehow human rights free. 42 And yet, the conferment of
widespread cultural legitimacy on the human rights project has
been increasingly recognized as necessary precondition for the
abridgmeut of the wide gap between theory and practice in
international human rights law, and the fostering of widespread
everyday respect for human rights .43 And without finding the
40. The discussion in note 37 and the accompanying text regarding the uproar
among Western states and NGOs that followed the conferment of the
mandate on the HRCAC to study the ways and means of "Promoting Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Detter Understanding of
Traditional Values of Humankind" is illustrative here. The dominant current
in the contributions to the debate on the mandate of those who opposed it
was a near-absolute suspicion and characterization of culture as the enemy of
human rights. The HRCAC's report, however, attempted to dispel this
notion in part. See UN Doc. A/HRC/22171, supra no1e 37.
41. See Nyamu, supra note 39 at 392; Okafor, "Attainments," supra note 39.
42. Ibid.
43 Sec D. Bell: 111e East Asian Challenge for H11111a11 Righrs (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Pres, 1999); A.A. An'im: Human -Righrs in CrossCul!ural Perspectives: A Quesr for Consensus (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1995); J . Donnelly, "The Relative Universality of
Human Rights" (2007) 29 Hum Rts Q 281; P.T. Zeleza: "The Struggle for
Human Rights in Africa" in P.T. Ze!eza & P.J. McConnaughay, eds,
Human Rig/us, The Rule of Law, and Develop111enr in Africa (Philadelphia:
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spaces that local cultural contexts provide for the advancement
of the human rights project, this task will be much harder, if
not practically impossible. 44
As might be expected, IHRFF has not been immune to
infection by this virus. As Baxi has observed, we do not as a
community "know enough beyond the 'myth' of the noble
savage in what and which ways a peoples' knowledge systems
are more conducive to the creation /sustenance of human right$
cultures." 45 Yet, IHRFF has not tended to focus on this
question; it has not turned its attention to learning from the
subaltern natives what in their Ctlltural traditions promotes or
protect (or could be deployed to promote or protect) human
rights in their own societies and local contexts. IHRFF has
tended to concentrate on the things we know much about
already, but not on the things we do not k!1ow much about a~
yet, such as the pro-human rights local cultures of Third
World peoples. Similarly, as a form of praxis that is basically .: ..
designed to locate and di$.seminate information about hm:µan
rights violations around the world, IHRFF has .understandably
tended to focus on human rights violation$ in the Third World,
and not on the contributions made to Qie.~hu111an rights project.. ·,
by Third World countries and their pe.QRles. Iii these ways, - .;
mostly through the "gaping" ~nd "loud"· .silences it authors,
IHRFF helps create a wjdespread sens~ ~nd · experience of "
Third World Cultures as unqualifiedly . and monolithically
harmful to human rights.

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Okafor, "Attainments," supra note
39.
44. Nyamu, supra note 39 at 417; Okafor, "Attainments," supra note 39 at 308.
45. Baxi, "Random Reflections," supra note 15 at 2; Baxi, "Future of Human
Rights," supra note 12 .
.

; '

J11tematio11al flu111a11 Rights Fact-fi11di11g Praxis
in its Living Forms: A 1WAIL perspective

81

The Production of a Conceptual "Economy of
Ap pear auces"
Here, the question is the extent to which the dominant forms of
IHRFF do what the critical socio-legal scholar Kamari Clarke
accuses (international) law of doing in other contexts, i.e.
engagement in the production of a conceptual "economy of
appearances" in which a person, group , or country is featured
as a culprit (or human rights violator) without necessarily
fingerin,g the full cycle of consumption, exploitation, apuse,
and so on, that fed or feed the chain of events that ultimately
produced the violation. 46 The question is whether when
. persons engaged in IHRFF conduct an investigation for a
·· limited number of days in a country (as they tend to do), do
' · fue practical economies of time and knowledge (the little time
_:..:. ·available and the lack of in-depth knowledge of the history and
.. · context) that frame their mission tend to impose a problematic
.... '. or even harmful conceptual economy of appearances that de."-,. contextualizes and therefore distorts their understanding of the
, : situation that is subject to IHRFF? One way to relate this point
·;. ~o real life is by invoking the issue of land reform and re. ." 4.istribution in places like Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South
· Africa .. For example, why is there a heavy focus (and at times
·· almost exclusively) on the contemporary suffering of scores or
hundreds of dispossessed white farmers and far less (if at all)
on the centuries-long dispossession and suffering of millions of
black Zimbabweans? 47 The two kinds of suffering arc
important, but why displace this last kind of suffering to a
large degree and concentration with the first kind of suffering?
Why not focus on the "full cycle'', a methodology that would
K.M. Clarke: "The Rule of Law through its Economy of Appearances"
(20 11) 18 Ind J Global Legal Stud 7 at 12.
47. See Okafor, "Attairunents," supra now 39.
46.
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portray a more accurate story of initial dispossession leading to
the on-going restitutive re-possession? However, even when
IHRFF has attempted to focus on the full cycle, it does not, in
my view, do it in a satisfactory way. 48

A Colonialist Style and Approach'?
As commentators who work in a range of approaches
(including TWAIL Scholars) have long agreed, no asset is
more important to a human rights fact-finder than the
credibility of her report and her reputation for meticulous
methodology . .49 Indeed, with regard to NGOs (be these
international or local) it is quite correct to conclude, as Diane
Orentlicher has, "the credibility of their fact finding is their
stock-in-trade." 50 This is one reason that when it comes to
IHRFF, the robustness, meticulousness and acceptability of its
methodology matter so much that the praxis has often· "come
under scrutiny, and at times attack," and should continue to be
subject to rigorous evaluation and critique. 51 Another reason
for placing IHRFF's methodologies under our watchful eyes is
that, needless to say, the conclusions drawn by those who
conduct IHRFF often have important (and even serious)
consequences for the countries affected, especially when they
are weaker Third World states. For example, such states could
find themselves relegated to a pariah status, the financial aid
they receive could be withdrawn, and invasions could be·
autl10ri scd or otherwise undertaken against them. 52 H is of
48. ibid.
49. See Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 85; M. Mutua, "The Politics of Human
Rights: Beyond the Abolitionist Paradigm in Africa" (1996) 17 Mich J Int'l
591; Blitt, supra note 3 at 9; Boutrouche, supra note lat 2.
50. Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 92.
51. Ibid at 85.
52. Ibid at 84.
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course trne that many govermnents, fearful of these kinds of
consequences, may have a strong incentive to discredit NGOproduced or other kinds of IHRFF Reports, but this realization
should not lead scholars and practitioners of international
human rights law alike to give IHRFF a free pass on
methodological rigour and acceptability.
In this sub-section, the first set of methodological critiques
of IHRFF is developed, albeit briefly. These critiques are
based on those aspects of IHRFF methodologies which, in one
way or another, tend to remind a TWAIL scholar, like myself,
of fue colonialist style/approach to treatment of Thii-d World
states, accompanied by all of its well-known problems. The
first such critique is that, all-too-often, IHRFF is undertaken
either at too high an orbit above the relevant Third World state
and/or from too far a distance; and that this is still apparent
even when the IHRFF includes some kind of field work or
mission component. This tends to remind one of the TWAIL
critique of the problematic way in which Europeans made and
re-made Africa into whatever they wished (at least initially)
largely through reading maps rather than through meeting
chaps - a theme that has been developed extensively
elsewhere. 53 With regards to IHRFF, the issue is that, all-toooften , important conclusions are reached and weighty
allegations made against a Third World (or other relevant)
state with either no visit at all to the state/location in question,
or (as is now more typical) with too short a visit, resulting in
allegations that are either de-contextualized or significantly
misleading~ or both. My analysis of the available eviden~e
53. See O.C. Okafor: Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: /11/emational Law and
State Fragmentation in Africa (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000). See
also J. Hargreaves: "The Making of the Boundaries" in A. I. Ashiwaju, ed.,
Pa11i1io11ed Africans (London: C. Hurst, 1985) at 23.
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suggests that, on average, UN IHRFF missions tend to last one
week; 54 international NGO IHRFF missions (such as those
undertaken by Amnesty International) tend to last longer··.
(which is a very good thing) but are sometimes still largely : ·
based on reporting from afar; 55 and that although the US State
Department's annual IHRFF Reports are based to son~e extent ·. : .
on reporting by their staff on-the-ground, too often staff did · ·
.not appear to have spent adequate rime in the particul~(·
places/regions within the relevant country that they are
reporting on. 56 What is more striking is that too many of these
US State Department Reports are often hea.vily based on arms- .
length reporting that is grounded on third party reporting · ·' : -:
(which is often not based on a sustained study on-th~:·_:.. ·. :.
ground). 57 If one was to be less charitable, they might even .. ·.. ·
describe this kind of IHRFF as "drive-by," or better still, "fly- ·
by" IHRFF. Yet, even the International Bar Association's
Fact-Finding Guidelines implores international human rights
.fact-finders, such as NGOs, to consider the importance of in-.;· .
country (i.e. local) knowledge in designing their IHRFF. 55 · '
However , sufficient local knowledge (especially about the.·
many complex societies which are often the focus of IHRFF) '.
cannot be acquired in the typical one-week missions that the
54. See J. Enns: "Research Memorandum on UN IHRFF Reports," 16
September 20 13 (prepared for and on file with the author).
55. See J. Enns, "Research Memorandum on Amnesty fnlcrnational's IHRFF
Reports," ·16 September 2013 (prepared for and on file with the author); and
J. Enns, "Research Memorandum on Human Rights Watch's IHRFF
Reports, " 16 September 2013 (prepared for and on file with the author).
56. See J. Enns, "Research Memorandum on the US Department of State's
IHRFF Reports," 16 September 2013 (prepared for and on file with the
author).
57. Ibid.
58. See International Bar Association and The Raoul Wallcnberg Institute, supra
note 1, at 3.
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UN and many other organizations undertake, and this would
hold true regardless of the number of weeks spent reading
literature on the relevant country, and the extent of reliance on
"native informants." 59 Reliance on satellite imagery cannot
cure this effect entirely, and may actually reinforc~ the "maps
rather than chaps" sentiment and substance of such IHRFF. Of
course, satellite imagery can, depending on the context, serve
as suppl~mental evi.dence (as long as a strong emphasis is
placed On the .worcf'. "supplemental"), GO but this cannot really
replace ethnographic best practices such as sustained studies
on-the-ground.
·
What is more, even when IHRFF is based substantially on
· some kind of field-wo.r k in the relevant place, it is still possible
to quarrel with certain aspects of the provenance, design and
approach of such missions as perhaps unwittingly reproducing
a colonialist style and approach. For one, there is too often a
high degree of power asymmetry between the observer and the
observed, between the fact-finders and their (usually Third
World) subjects or targets. The fact-finder is usually in a
significantly more powerful socio-political, discursive, and
economic position than the subjects of the IHRFF mission.
This is clearly so with regard to IHRFF that is conducted by
very powerful states such as the USA in the generally much
weaker Third World countries. This is also a concern with UN
IHRFF, because despite the balanced geographical
representation that tends to characterize its IHRFF teams, the
UN is still in a significant position of power relative to the
59. B. Bukovska: "Perpetrating Good: Unintended Consequences of
International Human Rights Advocacy" (2008) 9 Int'l JHR 7 at 11
[Bukovska].
60. See P. Alston and C. Gillespie: "Global Human Rights Monitoring, New
Technologies, and the Politics of Information" (2012) 23 EHL 1089 at 1113.

86

Tile Tra11s11ario11al H11111a11 Rigflrs Review

weaker Third World states and peoples. However, this concern
may be less salient with regards to international NGOs,
although it is still a significant concern vis:.a-vis their
relationships with the local NGOs (which ·are usually more
ideationally, financially and socially subordinate) and
activists. 61 This kind of power asymmetry may foster au
atmosphere of undue deference to the fact-finder in which
(through no fault of the fact-finder) the "native informant"
feels too beholden, subordinated or intimidated to question the
fact-finder and leads the team towards what the informant
thinks the team wa\1ts to see or hear, resulting in bias in the
inexorably large qualitative conclusions drawn by an IHRFF
mission. Importantly, rather than eliminating or reducing the
relations of power and domination that the Third World natives
often experience, this kind of power asymmetry may actually
reinforce and augment it, albeit in a different way. 62 It is for
such reasons that critical anthropologists and even some
international lawyers have long warned against a lack of
alertness to the negative effects of the "power-dynamics of the
researcher-subject interaction" and "the relationship of
inequality between the observer and the observed," such as the
"the power of the researcher to construct the story. "63
Another such methodological problem is that IHRFF
missions to Third World states tend to be either heavily
composed of Western or Western-trained fact-finders, or
undertaken under the ultimate direction of people of this
background. 64 This may, in Mutua's now famous metaphor,
61. See e.g. O.C. Okafor: Legitimizing Human Rigflrs NGOs: Lessons from
Nigeria (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2006) al 123-150.
62. See Bukovska, supra nole 59 at 8.
63 . See Merry, supra note 11 at 241. See also Viljoen, supra note 5 al 52.
64. As has been previously noted, all but one UN country rapporteur in office
between 2008 and 2013 was a Western national, lived and worked in the
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evoke the image in some observers and produce the experience
in some participants, of the Western or Westernized "savioµr"
looking to find facts from the locals in order to author a script
that will lead to the rescue of Third World "victims" from
their own "savages"; a familiar colonialist relational
st1ucture. 65 There are, of course, all kinds of problems with
this type of relationship, but suffice it to say that at the very
least, it can bias fact-finding results by imposing on it only one
kind of broad perspective, and filtering it through only one
kind of broad prism. This is especially so because fact-finding
and the· reporting that is based on it necessarily involves a
degree of qualitative in-put. 66 However, it should be noted that
some aspects of UN Human Rights Council-driven IHRFF,
such as those conducted by working groups and the Universal
Periodic Review ("UPR") that is handled by the Council itself,
with their usually geo-politically balanced teams, may not be
as susceptible . to this kind of critique as other forms of
IHRFF. 67 And although, the identities of the particular
researchers who conducted the mission is often left unclear,
and much remains to be done in this direction, even the large
international NGOs seem to have begun to adapt their craft to
blunt some of this criticism by ensuring more balance in their
IHRFF teams. 68 Nevertheless, it bears re-iteration that even if

65.
66.
67.

68.

West, or was trained in a Western country. US State Department IHRFF is
basically conducted by US officials. And even the international NGOs are
undeniably Western-dominated.
See Mutua, "Savages" , supra note 15; Merry, supra note 11 at 242.
See Orentlicher; supra note 2 at 95.
For these kinds of UN Human Rights Council fact-findi ng, see
hrtp:llwww.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc!pages!hrcindex. aspx (30 October
2013).
See for e.g. Human Rights Watch, "'They arc Killing Us': Abuses against
Civilians in South Sudan's Pibor County," Sept 20 13 at 45.
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the UN, US State Department, and the international NGOs
could escape the criticism that their teams are dominated by
Westerners, they usually cannot escape the attack that these
teams tend to be heavily populated by Western-trained
persons . The point here is not that a Western-trained person or·
even a \Vesterner cam1ot bring a different "non-mainstream
Western" lens to the subject, but that this is usually less likely
to occur than when s/he is inunersed in the Western idiom and
experience.
Other Problematic Methodological Issue~
Three methodological questions are discussed here which may
be asked of IHRFF but do not necessarily or easily relate to
the colonialist style or approach. These relate to the question
of selectivity in the choice of targets of IHRFF; the role of
subjectivity in our inexorably qualitative IHRFF system; and
the standards of proof that ground IHRFF. conclusions. These
will be examined once after the other. With regard to the issue
of the selection of the subjects of IHRFF, of the peoples and
places where IHRFF is to take place (an issue also encountered
in anthropology69), it must be acknowledged ~t the outset that
UN, NGOs, and individual state-driven. IfIRFF have come a
long way from the time they were focused almost entirely on
the "other", who was usually located in the Third World. UPR
has appreciably reduced selective IHRFF at the UN; the
largest INGOs now tend to survey most states in the world on
an annual basis; and even the US ammal country reports are
near-universal in geographical scope. 70 Yet, there is still some

69. See Merry, supra note 11 at 254.
70. On the UPR system, see Redondo, supra note 36. On the largest NGOs, see
for e.g. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012, online:
hrtp:/lwww.hrw.org/world-report-2012 (30/10/2013). On the US State
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way to go towards achieving a sufficient degree of fairness
(with more evenness) in the selection of the targets of IHRFF
by any of the afore-mentioned categories of fact-finders. For
instance, as has been noted - despite the onset of the UPR
mechanism - the analysis of the available UN data suggested
that almost every single country rapporteur in office between
2008 and 2013 targeted a Third World state. 71 The analysis of
the available evidence regarding the largest international NGOs
also suggest~ that although they do tend to issue annual .
surveys that target developing and developed states alike, the
other kinds of reports issued by them are still (deservedly or
otherwise) focused for the most part on the Third World. 72 The
problems with the seemingly selective targeting of certain
(usually Third World) states for IHRFF have been so
adequately discussed in the literature that they will not be
rehashed here. It is sufficient to point out that: (a) it was these
kinds of concerns that in part led to the most far-reaching
reform of the UN human rights system since 1945 (leading to
the creation of the UPR system), 73 and that (b) it is wellacknowledged that such selectivity tends to denude the popular
legitimacy of IHRFF among important actors and even
population areas in the world. 74
Department,

sec

Annual

Country

Reports

2012,

online:

//ttp:/lwww.state.gov/j/rls/llrrp1/ (301I0/2013).
71. See sub-section 1 of this section of the article.
72. For e.g., while about 54 of the 58 other kinds of reports issued by Human
Rights Watch in 2013 (as at 27 October 2013), i.e. over 93%, targeted
Third World countries, only about 4 of these 58 or so reports, i.e. 6.9 %,
targeted non-Third World states. Yet, TI1ird World States only make up
about 78 % of the total number of states in the UN.
73. For instance, see the commentary of the Child Rights Network on the UPR
system, online: /11tp:/lwww.cri11.org/HRCIUPR.asp (30/10/2013).
74. For e.g., see Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 98.
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With regards to the issue of the role of subjectivity in our
inexorably qualitative IHRFF system, Frans Viljoen put it well
when he reminded IHRFF practitioners that they "should be
aware of their active role in constructing a social reality" in
the course of their work. 75 Viljoen is also correct when he
declares that while IHRFF practitioners often put their best
efforts and do want to examine the relevant situations in as
objective a maimer as they possibly can, "on the whole,
though, fact-finding is inherently subjective and depends on a
multiplicity of factors relevant to the construction of the factual
world. " 76 The point here is not merely that IHRFF in its living
forms (as opposed to IHRFF in theory or on article) is
inexorably qualitative, a point that is well-acknowledged in the
literature and which has been reiterated by at least one senior
international human rights activist,77 but also that its findings
and conclusions are also co-constructed - often unwittingly by the very persons who are in theory objectively "looking" at
the reality in the relevant place or society. The act of
"knowing" is inherently mediated by a host of subjective
factors and intermediaries, and IHRFF is not inunune from
this mediation process . From the choice of places to visit or
witnesses to interview , to the analysis of the "evidence"
gathered, the fact-finder 's background perspective on the
target place and people, her opinions on the issues at hand, her
training, her biases (or even her prejudices) seep into the
process of decision-making (e.g. the processes of believing
some witnesses over the others, or forming conclusions). For
example, an opinion on whether a glass is half-full or halfempty at a given point in time is an inexorably qualitative and
75 . See Viljoen, supra note 5 at 52.
76. Ibid.
77. See Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 95.
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constructed conclusion. But what really is the problem with
this, one may ask? The main concern with the way in which
the fact-finder's background biases (or even prejudices) seep
into the process of IHRFF is, for example, that the biases that
most people (including all-too-many Africans) seem to have
about Africa tend to be very negative in most respects, too
often blinding them to the positives about the peoples and
places there, thereby significantly distorting and even
falsifying to a degree their findings and conclusions. And since
human rights fact-finders are a part of the societies in which
they live· and function, IHRFF cannot possibly be entirely
immune to this problem. Regardless of their factual accuracy,
one only needs to think of the rampant talk largely in
uncomplimentary tones about the "Dark Continent" 78 or the
"Hopeless Continent" 79 to understand this point. More
specifically, Tiyambe Zeleza has noted the way in which
human rights discourse tends to speak and write about Africa
and Africans almost always in terms of their "lack" of
something. Further, Mutua has demonstrated the way in which
Africa and Africans continue to be viewed, more often than
not, as either savages or victims who inhabit a benighted world
in desperate need of saviours from elsewhere, usually the
West. 80 These conclusions also apply to the relationship
between the human rights movement and most of the Third
World. 81 Thus, much vigilance is required to ensure that
IHRFF controls for the negative background images that all-tomany people wittingly or unwittingly bring to their analysis of
78. C. Achebe: "An lmage of Africa: Racism in Conrad's Heart of Darl01css"
(1977) 18 Mass L Rev l.
79. See The Economist, 13 May 2000.
80. See Mutua: "Savages", supra note 15.
81. ibid.
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events in Africa and most of the Third World; biases that can
refract and distort the reality.
With regards to the issue of the standard of proof required
to determine that a piece of information that is offered by a .
witness being interviewed in a process of IHRFF is factual,
Theo Boutrouche once stated that the most commonly used
standard is proof on a balance of probabilities. 82 If this was so
in all cases, and there was clarity in the understanding of its
meaning, then there would not a problem with IHRFF in this
regard. However, an examination of the first report issued by
th~
Independent International Commission of Inquiry
established by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate the
serious abuses of human rights and humanitarian law allegedly
conm1itted in Syria in the last few years appears to suggest that
there remains some confusion regarding the standard that
should be adhered to, and what it means precisely. Indeed,
while that report explicitly states that "on the specific issue of
what the facts of human rights violations" in Syria were (and
not on the question of the identity of perpetrators), the
standard of proof it used was merely one of "reasonable
suspicion" 83 this standard was applied in its subsequent
reports, but described differently as " reasonable grounds to
believe. " 84 It is unclear how widespread this confusion is
82. See iloutrouchc, supra note l at 9.
83. See Report of tile !11depe11de11t l11tematio11al Co111111issio11 of lnq11i1y 011 t/1e
Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.l, 23 November 2011,
at para 5; T. Marauhn: "Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights Council
Fact-Finding in Situations of Armed Conflict - The Case of Syria" (2012) 43
Cal W Jnt'l LJ 401 at 426.
84. Sec for e.g., Report of the Independent lntemational Co111111issio11 of Inquiry
on tile Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, at
para 10; Report of tire lndependem lntemational Commission of lnquiJy on
the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, at
paral l.
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regarding the stanq~d of proof ·
be utilized, since · - as
Boutruche has noted - most IHRFF teports do not adequately
: discuss the standards of proof adopted 'in preparing them. 85
Nevertheless, whatev.e r the extei:it of the confusion, at least one
danger is apparent: if a state .is one .of the "usual suspects",
one which is already viewed widely as belonging to the club of
"human rights violators," the mistaken use of a standard that is
lower than "reasonable · grounds to believe," would mean
· reliance on a standan;l. that is largely grounded on suspicion
. and not fact. This WO\lld place the target state at grave risk of
unfair and inaccura.~e s.tigmati.z~tion. 'This danger of unfair
stigmatization is compounded w.hen reports that are based on
· the first report (no m~tter how c~refully ·calibrated and crafted)
reiterate ~e suspicioil. expressed in the first report as if it was
in fact already proven on a balance of probabilities or even
beyo.nd a reasonable dqubt. It sho~ ld be noted, of course, that
if a state walks 4\11 aµiong the group of "innocents" which
. (whatever their record) tend to . b~ viewed in general as
resp~c~ers of human rights, then this risk is much more
remote.
.

'

· Susceptibility to Capture by Global Power
·Apart from TWAIL scholars who have demonstrated or noted
the r'elationships among human rights movements and global
net.works or matrixes.of power (hereinafter "global power"), 86
at . least one . senior inte(natio.nal .,human rights activist has
acknowledged the rather obvious fact that the movement's
85 . See Boutrouche, supra ~<;>ie l at 10. : .
86. See B. Rajagopal: Intimational .law froln'. Below (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003);_: See MUtua, ~Savages", supra note .15; Baxi,
"Future of Human Rights" , supra qo~e 12; Okafor, "Attainments," supra
note 39. at 310.
.,,
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orientation and activities (including those related to IHRFF)
can have highly important consequences for the behaviour of
global power toward weaker (especially Third World) states. 87
For example, development aid can be, and has been, cut off in
part as a result of one or more IHRFF reports. 88 Such aid can,
in the result, also be subjected to more or less tough
conditions. 89 The recent experience of Rwanda is a case in
point. 90 Similarly, NGO IHRFF has been known to bolster the
position of lobbyists who want a powerful regime to take one
course of ·action or another, sometimes against a weaker state.
Thus, IHRFF often pro.vides informa tion to powerful
governments for use (for good or for ill) in their policy and
decision.,.making processes. These are but a few examples of
the relationships between IHRFF and global power. 91
However, this is not, of course, to suggest that human
rights fact-finders always _or mostly set their task with a view
of serving the interests of global power. Indeed, it is an
obvious fact that NGO fact-finding reports, for instance, have
too often contradicted and annoyed many a powerful
government, including the most powerful of them all. 92 The
same can be said for some UN human rights reports. 93 The
87.
88.
89.
90.

See Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 84.
Ibid.
Ibid.

See
Su11day
Mo11iror,
6
October
2013,
online:
ltt Ip: I llv1111v.111011iIor. co.11g /Ne1vs/National/Kagame-tells-off-Oba111a-011-aidc111-over-Co11go-war/-/68833/2019954/-/gua58jzl-li11dex. Ju111l (2 7 October
2013).
91. See S. I. Skogly: "Human Rights Reporting: TI1e 'Nordic' Experience"
(1990) 12 Hum Rts Q 513 al 516.
92. See Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 86.
93. Many of the Reports submitted on the dumping of hazardous waste by
former Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Ms.
Fatma-Zora Ouhachi Vesely: had this effect on some powerful states. See
for e.g. UN Doc.E/CN.4/2004/46/Add. I of 22 December 2003.
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point here is that, whatever the underlying intent may be, alltoo-often IHRFF praxis does in fact service (or at least reflect)
the interests and configuration of global power to a significant
extent.
This is easily shown and should hardly be
controversial among discerning observers of the international
scene.
For one, it has long been acknowledged that IHRFF often
produces the justification for more powerful actors to decide to
exercise what has come to be referred to, rather too
optimistically, as their "responsibility to protect" (howsoever
secondary in nature ·that responsibility is) .94 Again the point is
not whether or not the specific instance of IHRFF was
designed to perform this role, but that IHRFF praxis will need
to be more careful about this capacity of global power to
influence, or worse still manipulate, the otherwise genuine
desire of the human rights movement to expose human rights
abuses. For example, it troubled not a few people bow the
plight of Afghan women under the Taliban suddenly assumed
centre-stage as one justification fo r the invasion and occupation
of Afghanistan. 95 Secondly, many have noted . the
disproportionate influence of powerful Western and/or veto:..
power endowed governments, as well as the powerful
international (read largely Western) NGOs on the human rights
movement in general and on IHRFF in particular. 96 Others
have commented on the fact that human rights (and by

94. See A. Orford: fmematio11al Aut/lority and tile Responsibility to Proteci
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); D. 'Kennedy, Tile Dark ·
Side of Virtue (Princeton: Princcton University Press, 2005) at xvii; Riles,
supra note 39 at 19.
95. Sec Action Aid, "A Just Peace?: the Legacy of War for the Women of
Afghanistan," 3 October 2011 at 2.
96. See Bassiouni, supra note 6; Mutua: "Savages". supra note 15.
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extension IHRFF) can hardly be discussed intelligently without
·analyzing the disproportioy.ate influence of powerful large
donors based primarily i1_1 Europe and the USA who promote
certain preferred human tfghts projects over others. 9 ~ Again, it
appears that, just like its paretit discipline, IHRFF praxis is
quite weak at disciplining g~obal power (even in a Foucauldian
sense). 98 How many times,. one may ask, has a veto-power
endowed (or P5) state been subjected to·serious IHRFF by the
UN .Human Rights Council or a large international NGO
(especially one that led to significant consequences)? The
answer is . "rarely," if one goes by· the number of times the
most severe Council measure of the appointment of a country
rapporteur has been applied, but changes to "often" if the less
severe UPR is utilized as the measure. With regard to IHRFF
by the international NGOs t~rgeting these states, the answer is
- as we have seen - quite. s~milar . :How many times have the
stronger Western states been subjected to such IHRFF? Going
by the same measures, the: answers appear not to be dissin;iilar
from the ones offered abov.e: One is then. tempted to ask: is it
because of its relative capture. by global power that IHRFF
appears to be complicit to ·the degree · th~t seems evident in
global power's constructibn qf factual and normative fabrics
and landscapes which eubji,nce :.the latter's dominance over
global affairs?
. ': ' ~ · · ·
The overall point h.ere':is that IHRFF practitioners need to
continue Lo worry and even perhaps more so, that power
refracts the picture of the world we typically receive and
reproduce. For example, ~igerians or Indian NGOs typically
don't have the resources to go do IHRFF in any kind of
sustained way in US inner cities, France's Parisian suburbs, or
97. See Riles, supra note 39 at I~ .'
98. See Okafor, "Attainments," supra. note 39.
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Chechnya. As such .the uncomplimentary pictures of those
places are not as fore-grounded as they could have become
were this the case. Is it then capture by global power that
IHRFF does not tend to fore-ground these images and thus
bolster the resistance of the subalterns in US inner cities?

What Should IHRFF then Become?
It is no secret in informed circles that IHRFF has for long been
troubled by certain difficulties. and problems. For example,
Phillip Alston had long characterised IHRFF as
ad
hoe, ·and
often
·methodologically
inconsistent,
99
It was as a result of similar conclusions
unsatisfactory.
regarding the state of the art of IHRFF that a host of early
scholars, commentators and organizations made important
efforts to propose ways and means of designing, composing
and conducting IHRFF in the best possible way. Even as of the
1980s , a measure of consensus had developed in the academic
literature that IHRFF needed to abide by some basic
principles, howsoever informal these may be, and whatever the
risk of over-standardization. 100 Examples of these proposals
include those made separately by Thomas Franck and Scott
Fairley, and Dianne Orentlicher. One of the main contributions
made by Franck and Fairley was to propose that in order to
ensure the impartiality of IHRFF (something that is highly
essential for its legitimacy and effectiveness) much care should
be devoted to five core issues, namely: the choice of subjectmatter of investigation; the choice of mission .members;
·99. See Alston, supra note 3; Talsma, supra note 3 at 402.
100. See Blitt, supra note 3 at 58; Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 85; H. Hannum,
"Fact-Finding by Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations" in ~. B.
Lillich, ed., Fact-Finding Before llllernationa/ Tribunals (Ardsley-onHudson, N.Y: Transnational Publishers, 1992) at 295.
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methodology of investigation; the comprehensh~eness of the
terms of reference; and the way the mission's report will be
utilized. 101 For her own part, Orentlicher had urged that
IHRFF missions should avoid a politically-biased selection of
witnesses; draw upon a broad, diverse and representative
range of sources; use a large enough sample of testimony;
corroborate direct testimony; and utilize knowledgeable
secondary sources in the relevant locales (e.g. domestic
NGOs, lawyers, foreign diplomats, and journalists). 102 ·
Much more recently, innovative proposals for the
strengthening of IHRFF have been made in the writings of
scholars such as Alston .and Gillespie, and Land. Alston and
Gillespie have proposed the greater use of technology to
deepen pluralism in IHRFF and bring in local (especially Third
World) activists more meaningfully into the international
aspects of that praxis. 103 More specifically, they have, for
example, called for collaboration among international NGOs
toward the production of something that is akin to international
human rights Wikipcdia. 104 For her own part, Molly Land has
lauded the developing trend toward peer-based production of
human rights reports which are t.1ien posted onto international
e-platforms (such as the various Wikis or "the Hub") by many
of those - usually in the Third World - who were traditionally
the subjects, and not the agents, of IHRFF (although she notes
that crcdibilily issues· remain and warns that the most
JO l. See T.M. Franc.:k and H.S. Fairley: "Procedural Due.: Process in Human
Rights Pact-Finding by International Agencies (1980) 74 /\m J Int'l L 308 at
309; Blitt, supra note 3 at 63.
102. See Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 109.
103. See P. Alston and C. Gillespie: "Global Human Rights Monitoring, New
Technologies, and the Politics of Information" (2012) 23 EJIL 1089 at 1114
[Alston and Gillespie).
104. Ibid.
.
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uneducated and poorest populations in those places may still
not be able to participate in nearly as much measure in these
innovative and pluralizing IHRFF activities as the more elite
segments).
But despite all of these attempts to make proposals for the
reform, systematization and improvement of IHRFF, and the
many important improvements that have actually been made to
it, it appears that IHRFF praxis still ~emains significantly
challenged .to this day by methodological and other difficulti~s
and problems. As one author has put it, even the UN (which
began efforts to think through and reform its IHRFF as far
back as 1970, which adopted a Code of Conduct for some of
its fact-finders as recently as 2007, and which has made other
reform efforts since then) has not as yet succeeded in achieving
much coherency in the methodology of IHRFF. 105
Against this backdrop, the rest of this section is devoted to·
pointing to some guideposts and markers that frame and thus
help define more ideal IHRFF (as seen through a TWAIL
prism). It should be stated at the outset that there is no
pretence here that this exercise is a .comprehensive one, or that
it identifies all the possible characteristics of "ideal IHRFF" either in a TWAILian sens~ or howsoever it is conceived.
First, it must be pointed out that TWAIL would generally not .
argue for less IHRFF, but would in fact speak in favour of
more of that praxis (albeit in its more ideal form). This point is
decipherable from the discussions in the last section of this
article on the problems wit.h an adherence to the heaven/hell
binary and the one-way st.reet parad.igm; and the problematic
nature of the fixation of much IHRFF on the orientation of the
Western gaze. The major point here is that IHRFF needs to
105. See Talsma, supra note 3 at 402.
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continue expanding its geo-political focus even more than it
already has, well beyond the usual (Third World) suspects.
Second, as Frans Viljoen has conJ!ctly argued, an IHRF;F
report "sh0uld be regarded as the outcome of a discurs'ive
contest in which the fact-finder plays a co-constitutive role. " 106
Against this background , ideal IHRFF (as seen from a TWAIL:
perspective) would be designed and conducted by a team that
. .. ~ is - · as much as possible - gco-politically and ideologically "
palanced. This kind of .balancing would contribute greatly to
the· "objectivity" of the fact-finding process, 107 or at least it
credibility , 108 and would bolster the global legitimacy of
IHRFF, ·and augment its effectiveness in the long-run.
· · Problems related to the fixation of much IHRFF on the
Western gaze, and the one-way traffic paradigm, would also
be ameliorated in the result. And although the UN Human
Rights Council prides itself as steeped in such balancing ·
praxis, it should not be forgotten that it currently has over
forty individual, i.e. one person, special rapporteurs
(excluding the admittedly balanced "working groups") . The
largest INGOs engage in this kind of balancing, to an extent,
but in the view of Viljoen's unassailable point, this practice ·
should become much more systematized and widespread.
Third, IHRFF should become more and more like UPR,
and less and less like its former, very ad-hoe, and mostly
selective, self. For sure, IHRFF has come far from its earliest ·
days when it was widely criticized for its excessive selectivity.
While hardly perfect in this regard, UN IHRFF (mainly
106: See Viljoen, supra note 5 al 52. ·
107. See L. Talsma: "UN Human Rights Fact-Finding: Protecting a Protection
Mechanism" (2012) 20 JLSA Q 29 at 31.
.
108. See T.M. Franck and L.D. Cherkis: "The Problem of Fact-Finding 'in
International Disputes?" (1967) 18 Western Reserve Law Review 1483 at
1483.
.
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because of the UPJ3. system) and to some extent the IHRFF of
the largest international NGOs, have become more universal
than they used to be and therefore less narrowly focused in
geo-political terms. Thus, the UPR system is a practical
response that can help blunt the Western gaze, heave~hell
binary, and one-way street paradigm critiques, among others,
and should be popul~rized among practitioners of JHRFF, and
well beyond the UN.system ..
Fourth, despi·t ~ the obvious resource ~onstraints, from a
TWAIL perspective, I would argue in favour of the
intensification of the method of country-visits; i.e. the devotion
and utilization of more substantial periods of time, and in a
more sustained and repeated way, to each IHRFF mission. The
UN , international NGOs, and even the US Department of State
should be conunended for at least using this method to some
extent and to varying degrees. But as has been noted, the ways
in which it has been used to date still tends to be far from
satisfactory .
And so, the fifth point is that there is a sense in which
ideal IHRFF would - from a TWAIL perspective - look more
like the best kinds of (critical) ethnography. Anthropologists
like Sally E?gle Merry have noted the striking similarities
between much IHRFF and much ethnography. As she has put
it, "Human rights activism [including IHRFF] typically relies
on forms of data collection and research such as surveys,
personal narratives, and case studies that are similar to
research methods used in anthropology. " 109 Yet, as these same
scholars have also qbserved, there are nevertheless significant
differences between the two fields of endeavour. For, as
Merry has also noted, "successful activists focus on telling
109. See Merry, supra note 11at 241.
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compelling personal cases with simple story lines of suffering
and responsibility ... designed to generate outrage and
action:.. Academics are more likely to tell more complex, even
involuted stories. " 110 Put differently , academics have to use
nuance and intricacy while activist stories tend to be
straightforward and emotionally engaging. 111 Given the
inescapable reality that IHRFF often has to deal with complex
situations that defy simplistic or linear story lines, the search
for more credible IHRFF conclusions should be bolstered by a
greater degree of adherence· to the academic ethnographer's
approach. · The point here is that the more IHRFF begins to
look like the ·best ethnography, the more credibility it will have
in the long term, whatever the short term benefits of deploying
the current techniques of oversimplification, in order to appeal
to the. consciences of the .audienc_e. This should not require
IHRFF to become the exact same thing as critical ethnography
but rather that · IHRFF simply needs to move farther along in
that direction.
1n a similar vein, the sixth point is that IHRFF needs to
hecotne·.. even more alert to the ~angers of operating from a
high · o'rbit or ·on a long-distance plan. For, clearly, the
intricacies of the local human rights condition are not as easily
observed or appreciated from a far way off or from a thirtythousand feet altitude. The potential for error is far greater at
thi~ height and distance, no matter the power of the longdistancc lens that is used. Once it is realized tlrnt IHRFF can·
have grave consequences for the target cou ntry. or pcoplC, the
importance of holistic accuracy becomes even clearer.
However ,. such a degree of accuracy cannot be achieved
regarding complex social realities without the kind of deep-.
110. Ibid at 241.
11 l. Ibid,
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textured local knowledge that can only come from close
engagement with the target population or phenomenon, usually
on the ground. 112 With regards to accuracy, such deep 10cal
knowledge _can at times be almost the fu ll picture. This is why
delicate care should be exercised regarding the increasing turn
to satellite imagery to provide key evidence of violations. 11 ~
Satellite imagery should at best be deployed as a supplemental,
if not marginal, tool.
Seventh, IH;RFF needs to do more to reduce the
conceptual economy of appearances that tends to characterize
and limit its ability to reach as deep an understanding of the
given situation as it could. In this vein, fact-finding should
bala nc~ contemporary information gathering with sociohistorical contextualization. 114 Only in this way can it capture
the "complicated and manifold circumstances" that shaped and
underlie the situation being observed during a mission. 115 Here
again, critical ethnography - with its tradition of in-depth
focus on the meanings and practices of small social spaces may provide a model, or at least a guide, for IHRFF. 116
Eighth, seen from a TWAIL perspective, ideal IHRFF
would be more careful about its susceptibility to deployment
and manipulation by global power to achieve ends, which are
in many cases significantly different from its intent. There is
not, of course, all that much that IHRFF practitioners can do
about !his io many instances. However, IHRFF practitioners
still need to be as rci1exive as they can about this possibility,
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and seek to limit any such potential danger of capture in any
way they can. For example, IHRFF can be more careful about
making pronouncements in certain cases, and may need to take
more time to study the relevant situations rather than rush to
issue press releases and statements based on preliminary
studies, that are then re-circulated by others as "gospel truth,"
and deployed by global power in unintended ways and as
i11eans to other ends.
These are some, and clearly not all, the guideposts to
designing and conducting "ideal IHRFF", that could be
offered to IHRFF practitioners from a TWAIL perspective.
Conclusion
In conclusion, all that remains to be reiterated is that the main
point of the above exercise is not just to point practitioners and
academics interested in this area in the direction of the
guideposts of what could be considered ideal IHRFF praxis,
from a TWAIL perspective, but to also identify and develop
tendencies against which, at a minimum, we all ought to
remain significantly alert to. Certainly such tendencies should
be combated where they do manifest, but it is also important to
guard against their manifestation in the first place through
good IHRFF design and practice. As such, the broader point
that this article makes is not necessarily that every type or
iteration of contemporary IHRFF is guilty of one of the pitfalls
identified in this article, but that good reasons remain for all
such IHRFF praxis to stand sentry at the gates of U1eir crafts,
lest they become affected by the problems discussed here.
Having said this, it must be acknowledged that IHRFF
does present a number of unique or serious challenges to the
investigator, and that this will invariably limit overall success
in achieving ideal IHRFF as conceived in this article. Yet, this
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realization ougbl not de-mobilize us from making every efforl
to fashion a sel of standards to which investigators should
aspire. 117 For as Thomas Franck once remarkedt cleverly I
must say, "a system's reach must exceed its grasp, or what's a
heaven for?" 118
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